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1. INTRODUCTION 
Decommissioning is a major issue today: around 83 commercial power reactors, 
44 experimental or prototype reactors, and over 250 research reactors have 
ceased operation worldwide. Besides, more than 300 power reactors were built 
25 or more years ago, so even if a part of them will have their lives extended, a 
fraction of them will have to shut down in the next decades. Besides that, this 
technological challenge is not limited to each single facility, but it also affects 
other parties involved, such as licensees, regulatory authorities, national 
authorities, radioactive waste management structures, etc. The decommissioning 
projects that are on-going, and those that will start in the future, can benefit from 
the experience and lessons learned in all the work that has been carried out in 
the past. 
However, while the exchange of operational experience has its established 
national and international mechanisms, the exchange of experience during 
decommissioning is developed to a lesser extent. Moreover, the existing 
exchange of decommissioning experience is not so focused in safety-related 
issues but rather on the technical and economical optimization of the projects.  
With this goal in mind, this document summarizes the Clearinghouse Topical 
Operating Experience Report, drafted by the European Clearinghouse, on events 
related to decommissioning [5], with the purpose of presenting relevant and 
useful lesson learned that can be extracted from international experience. It is 
focused on the decommissioning of nuclear power plants (NPP), (including 
experimental and prototype reactors when appropriate). Research reactors, used 
fuel or radioactive waste management and storage facilities are excluded from 
the scope of this study. 
 
 
2. MAIN TYPES OF EVENTS  
 
The decommissioning events have been analyzed and classified in the following 
categories: 
- Leakage of radiological effluents 
- Violation of Technical Specifications 
- Contamination and radiological protection issues 
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- Inadvertent actuation of equipment 
- Control of nuclear and radiological material 
- Other 
 
The following paragraphs summary the causes of the events and the corrective 
actions taken to mitigate the consequences, and impede their repetition, 
highlighting as well the main findings. 
Leakage of radiological effluents. Leakages and spillages of radiological 
effluents were caused by design errors, human errors, and malfunction of 
instrumentation. The corrective actions in this case consisted in arresting the 
leakage, cleaning and decontamination of the affected areas, and repair of the 
involved systems.    
 
Violation of Technical Specifications. This category comprises events related 
to the violation of technical specifications, operation outside of the design basis, 
or similar. These events were mainly caused directly by human errors, due to 
overlooking or misinterpretation of the procedures (although sometimes the 
procedures themselves were not fully adequate). However, a number of these 
events are attributable to the specific configuration of a facility undergoing 
decommissioning. In these cases, the violations were caused because the 
technical specifications were not updated along with the modifications 
implemented in the plant as a consequence of decommissioning activities (for 
example, the technical specifications could request tests and maintenance 
interventions in some equipment which is no longer used). This was due, in some 
cases, to a breach in the maintenance of license documents, and in some others, 
to misunderstandings on when a specific document would enter into force.  
A number of events were related to violations regarding the movement of heavy 
loads: movement outside allowed ranges, inadequate rigging and securing of the 
loads, insufficient checks, etc. The reason is that heavy loads are moved more 
frequently and on different, less routine routes during decommissioning.  
The corrective actions to avoid violation of technical specifications and other 
limits were the review or the reinforcement of the training and of the involved 
personnel, drafting, review and update of the necessary procedures and 
documents and the review or update of the organisation for the 
decommissioning. 
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Contamination and Radiological Protection issues. This category comprises 
inadequate handling of contaminated materials, and the discovery of radioactivity 
outside of the controlled area. 
The main causes were the inadequate planning of the works, inadequate 
packaging of contaminated equipment, dose calculation errors, and breach of the 
radiation protection programme (as radioactivity was found outside the fence). 
The corrective actions consisted in amending the found errors, by improving the 
procedures and the training, and updating the radiation protection programme. 
The radioactive material found outside the controlled area was removed, and the 
area cleaned or secured.  
 
Inadvertent actuation of systems or equipment. The events in this category 
have in common the inadvertent actuation of plant systems, or, on the contrary, 
the failure to actuate of plant systems.  
The main causes were failures of components or false initiating signals, caused 
either by material degradation, operational errors, or electrical disturbances. The 
corrective actions taken were to check if the actuation was justified, the 
replacement of the equipment, and the reparation of the system. Improvement of 
the procedures and reinforcement of the training were also frequent corrective 
actions, as well as small modifications to secure switches, etc.  
In some cases, the affected system was not needed for the decommissioning of 
the plant, which showed that not sufficient attention was paid to taking out of 
order some equipment or systems which, although necessary during the 
operational phase of the plant, were not needed during the decommissioning. 
The corrective action in this case consisted in putting out of order the affected 
system or equipment while removing all non-necessary surveillance or 
maintenance requests. 
In some other cases, systems that were needed were inadvertently or mistakenly 
disconnected while deactivating systems no longer needed for the 
decommissioning of the plant, normally because of human errors. The corrective 
actions consisted in re-establishing the operation of the incorrectly deactivated 
equipment or systems, as well as improving the management, training and 
preparation of non-routine operations. These events did not present risks, nor 
adverse consequences, but highlighted weaknesses in the organisation, 
management and monitoring of the decommissioning project. 
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Control of nuclear or radioactive material. Missing of nuclear or radiological 
material during decommissioning is another category of events. It is usually 
detected in inspections, in which the written records are examined and 
confronted to the physical identification of the material they refer to, or when the 
decommissioning activities aim at the management of such material. In some 
cases, the cause is operational (equipment that becomes contaminated and 
which is not controlled), and in some other cases, the causes are historical, and 
involve old nuclear or radiological material. The requirements to control nuclear 
and radiological material have been developed over the years, and nowadays 
are a lot stricter than in the past. Additionally, the available tools to keep record 
of the nuclear or radiological material have significantly improved over the years. 
The combination of these two factors limits the re-occurrence of such events. 
Corrective actions normally involved a search for the missing material, the 
assessment of the consequences of a potentially inadvertent shipment of this 
material elsewhere, and the reinforcement of the control and surveillance 
mechanisms (both in the licensee and regulatory authorities) to ensure that these 
events do not recur.  
 
Other. Several other events could not be classified in any of the categories 
described above. Although the nature of these events is different (design errors, 
operational errors, loss of offsite power, fires, dis-coordination of 
decommissioning teams, etc) the causes were quite similar, and always related 
to the need to adapt the structure and practices of the plant organisation to the 
new configuration for decommissioning.  
More specifically, the causes of events were related to inappropriate or 
incomplete previous evaluation of risks, inadequate work preparation and 
execution, inadequate surveillance, unclear distribution of responsibilities, etc. 
Corrective actions included the suspension of the works until the situation was 
normalized, reinforcement of the training and co-ordination, and especially the 
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3. MAIN FINDINGS  
 
This section summarizes the most important findings from the event analysis.  
Many decommissioning events reported were caused by human or design errors, 
inadequate manuals or procedures, and other well-known causes which are 
present in operational events of currently operating installations. But apart from 
these, the study has identified a number of contributing issues which are typical 
of the decommissioning of a nuclear facility.   
In effect, a number of events were caused by the inadequacy of the organisation 
put in place to carry out the decommissioning. The new organisation missed to 
rigorously and systematically transfer the responsibilities on safety from the 
operational organisation to the decommissioning organisation.  
The miss-coordination of different teams to carry out decommissioning activities 
in parallel, inadequate planning of decommissioning activities, inadequate control 
of the continuous update of guidelines, decommissioning technical specifications, 
and other license documents have shown that the plans for deactivation of 
system and components were not systematically and appropriately designed, 
executed and monitored. 
The nature of the decommissioning activities, in which a large number of 
interventions and works are carried out by many workers in many locations of the 
facility, can trigger the actuation of systems due to human errors, electrical 
disturbances, and other causes. Reduction of the maintenance work also causes 
malfunctions of equipment and systems that could be needed during the 
decommissioning. 
Similarly, the management of large quantities of diverse radioactive material, 
which is quite different to the management of radioactive material during normal 
operation, can be more prone to mistakes and gaps in the control measures. 
Another contributing cause is the evolution of the requirements for the control of 
nuclear and radiological material over time, which may imply that some legacy 
material is considered insufficiently controlled. 
These facts demonstrate the importance of paying sufficient attention to 
organisational and managerial issues during the transition period from operation 
to decommissioning. In particular, the importance of maintaining a strong, yet 
flexible organisation that ensures the continuity of important tasks that have to be 
carried out with the highest standards up to the very end of the decommissioning 
project. 
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4. RECOMMENDATIONS  
A number of recommendations have been extracted from the analysis of the 
reported events and also from the analysis of additional sources (see list in 
section 7) and are presented in the categories specified below. 
The more specific lessons learned from the events and other sources are listed 
in annex. 
 
Organization and management 
 Safe and efficient decommissioning of nuclear power plants is enhanced 
with early planning, sufficient funding, and with a national policy for 
decommissioning, waste management, and spent fuel management with a 
long term perspective.  
 A strong and flexible management is needed to face the continuous 
changes and evolution of the facility configuration, including the transition 
from operation to decommissioning. The management must ensure that 
there is always a clear responsibility defined in every task. This is also 
applicable in the case of outsourcing certain activities (i.e. to 
subcontractors). 
 The decommissioning team could significantly improve by incorporating both 
personnel with a deep knowledge of the facility to be decommissioned and 
external personnel with wide knowledge in decommissioning techniques and 
practices, although their specific knowledge on the particular plant to be 
decommissioned is limited. 
 During decommissioning projects, especially in the long term, it is very 
difficult to retain and obtain the best professionals in terms of knowledge, 
skills, and experience. This is due to both the difficulty of maintaining in the 
long term the knowledge and experience of one particular facility, and the 
scarce personnel skilled and experienced in decommissioning. The life 
extension of the nuclear facilities is an additional factor that could worsen this 
issue. Mechanisms to enhance record keeping and knowledge transfer need 
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Decommissioning Works 
 Simple and proven decontamination and decommissioning technologies 
are available, and have some advantages in comparison to new and 
innovative technologies. Where new and innovative technologies are 
foreseen, extensive testing and demonstration are required to ensure that 
the new technology will be capable of performing safely and efficiently the 
requested task. 
 During decommissioning, equipment and systems are operated in ways that 
are quite different than during routine normal operation. This fact yields to the 
need of defining these new ways of operations, as well as a potential for 
operational circumstances that might lead to unforeseen consequences (i.e. 
radioactive effluents directly discharged to the environment, inadequate 
heavy load handling). Retaining expertise and knowledge of plant systems, 
(especially with regards to non-routine operations during normal operation), is 
fundamental in order to devise both the operations specific of 
decommissioning, and the recovery actions (in case they are needed). 
 The decommissioning tasks are usually carried out in parallel by different 
work teams. These teams must have a very clear definition of their work, 
specifically with respect to the limits of the systems or areas in which they 
intervene, as well as the potential risks they might encounter. Additionally, 
the work teams must be adequately coordinated, so their activities do not 
interfere. 
 During decommissioning, a number of small modifications can be carried 
out successively, maybe by different teams. Sufficient consideration shall 
be paid to the cumulative effect of all the small modifications, especially 
when the individual changes are not significant. In these cases, work 
coordination shall be ensured so as the different teams respect the same 
plant restrictions, or plant conditions. 
 
Stakeholders. 
Early involvement of relevant stakeholders, along with close co-operation and 
open communication with them will help to establish a trustful relationship 
especially with regard to the activities to be carried out in the site and their socio-
economic impact in the local communities. Transparency in the communication of 
the main results of the safety assessment, especially those on risks and hazards 
is fundamental for not breaking the trust-based interaction. 
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Regulatory framework 
The application of the normal operational-based regulatory framework to the first 
decommissioning projects has highlighted the need for a graded approach of the 
regulation with the aim of reflecting the continuous reduction of the radiological 
hazard levels with the progression of the decommissioning project. At the same 
time, the radiological hazards shift to industrial hazards. These facts and the 
varying physical configuration of the plant as the decommissioning takes place 
require flexibility and quick adaptation of the regulatory framework. 
Additionally, regulatory requirements should focus on operational management 
(rather than on technical issues), importance of contamination control (rather 
than accident analysis), the inclusion of industrial safety and non-radiological 
hazards, and the management of changing situations. It seems appropriate that 









6. LIST OF ACRONYMS 
 
IRS International Reporting System 
LER Licensee Event Report (USA) 
DTS  Decommissioning Technical Specifications 
HSA                    Historical Site Assessment  
IAEA  International Atomic Energy Agency 
JRC  Joint Research Centre 
NEA  Nuclear Energy Agency 
OECD  Organization for the Economic Co-operation and Development 
TSO Technical Support Organizations 
US NRC  United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 




[1] Safe Decommissioning for Nuclear Activities. Proceedings of International 
Conference. Berlin, 14-18 October, 2002. IAEA, Vienna, August, 2003 
[2] Le Démantèlement des installations nucléaires de base. Contróle. La Revue 
de l’ASN. No 181. Novembre 2008. 
[3] NRC Decommissioning Lessons Learned. Year 2002 
[4] NRC Decommissioning Lessons Learned. Year 2007 
[5] Manuel Martín Ramos, 2012. Nuclear Power Plants Decommissioning 
Related Events, Technical Report. EC JRC/IET Petten, the Netherlands   
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APPENDIX: SUMMARY OF LESSONS LEARNED 
 
For Regulatory Bodies 
The vast majority of the waste material produced is inactive or below clearance 
levels and the use of clearance has the potential for saving considerable waste 
disposal costs. It then would be very useful to harmonize the clearance level in 
the different countries to avoid misunderstandings and trans-boundary problems, 
so the regulatory framework shall tend to simplification and flexibility.  
‘In process’ inspections, consisting in frequent interaction with the licensee during 
the decommissioning phase, are more efficient than ‘one time’ confirmatory 
surveys. 
The regulator can propose measures to prevent future legacy sites, by promoting 
changes in the financial assurance (to avoid shortfalls in decommissioning 
funding) or imposing conditions to the operating license (imposing conditions to 
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For Licensee 
Cornerstone Lessons Learned 
Planning  
Planning for the decommissioning must start as early as possible, being 
considered during the design phase if possible, and be complete, from 
shutdown to disposal.  
Discussions between regulators and licensees are encouraged before the 
decommissioning phase. Besides, the licensee shall coordinate early with 
all regulatory agencies regarding waste disposal options. 
Raising funds should also be addressed in an early stage, so a premature 
close can be successfully faced. 
Physical and radiological inventory is a prerequisite for adequate planning, 
especially regarding to waste management. 
Strategy 
The preferred strategy for decommissioning is immediate dismantling, 
which allows using the existing strengths of the facility. On the other hand, 
deferred dismantling can be a reasonable option in situations of lack of 
funding or waste management routes, or by external reasons.  
It should be taken into consideration the future use of the site 
Cost/Funding 
Funding for many facilities is the main reason for lack of progress in 
decommissioning. Waste management and labor cost of decommissioning 
activities are the two major contributors to the cost of decommissioning. 
The estimation of the decommissioning costs should be done in a prudent 
way based on appropriate risk management and external supervision.  
Project cost control should be integrated from the beginning into project 
planning and must be continually reinforced, and those who work in it must 
understand cost estimating well enough to anticipate potential cost 
problems.  
If the plant is shutdown before its planned operating lifetime, the 
decommissioning funds raised might not be enough, and adequate 
provisions, with the help of the authorities, must be put in place. 
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Management 
The management should be constituted by a small group with all 
disciplines involved. It is important to keep all departments involved. 
It is important to retain expertise and experience in construction in addition 
to keeping managers with operational experience. It is also important to 
obtain personnel with expertise in construction and/or demolition 
experience.  Management should assure a key early transition activity for 




Modeling Issues - Assumptions and justification for parameters used in 
developing site-specific calculations must be shared with the regulatory 
authority, and agreed upon. The models shall be realistic. 
Historical Site Assessment (HAS) has major impact on the planning and 
scheduling of all subsequent survey activities. Licensee shall dedicate 
enough time and resources to perform and effective HSA.  
Personnel questionnaires and interviews are a valuable source of 
information. Old records should not be used as the sole source of 
information, and must not substitute the radiological characterization. 
Additional environmental monitoring data for groundwater may be needed. 
Note that under leaking conditions, Tritium is by far the most mobile and 
pervasive radionuclide within the groundwater flow domain (other primary 
radionuclides of concern ring are Sr-90, Co-60, and Cs-137). 
Groundwater investigations are best undertaken with an iterative approach 
that can be expected to require a minimum to three years to complete, in 
even relatively simple situations.  
In developing the final survey design, the licensee needs to identify all 
appropriate data quality objectives (DQOs) in planning and designing the 
final status survey plan. The process of identifying the applicable DQOs 
ensures that the survey plan requirements, survey results, and data 
evaluation are of sufficient quality, quantity, and robustness to support the 
decision on whether cleanup criteria have been met using statistical tests. 
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Decontamination Decontamination should be performed immediately after the final plant 
shutdown while all the plant systems are still well maintained and 
operational and while knowledgeable plant operations personnel are still 
available.  
High flow rates yield better results. Operation of the reactor coolant pumps 
(RCPs) is recommended. Secondary pumps, such as residual heat 
removal pumps, should be used if the RCPs are not available. Vendor-
supplied pumps are the least preferable option since they will have smaller 
flow capacity than pumps at the site.  
The reactor pressure vessel (RPV) should be bypassed during chemical 
decontamination.  
For PWRs, inclusion of the steam generators (SGs) in the flow path should 
be seriously considered. To achieve flow to all the tubes would require 
operation of the RCPs. The major downside of including the SGs in the 
flow path is the additional waste.  
Flexibility is preferred to quick termination of the decontamination. To this 
end, extra chemicals should be stored on site in case the foreseen 
decontamination factor is not achieved and further cycles have to be 
implemented. 
The decontamination and the disposal of concrete must be faced and 
evaluated by a cost benefit analysis to understand if the savings of 
radioactive waste space compensate the additional costs of 
characterization and successive decontamination. 
Safety Safety in decommissioning comprises radiological safety, conventional 
safety, environmental protection, and public safety. The importance of each 
of them shifts from radiological safety towards conventional safety.  
Health physicists who understand the work should allocate radiation dose 
allowances to each project and monitor its use at least weekly.  
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Dismantling Extensive pre-deployment planning, simulation, and testing should be done 
prior to any onsite segmentation work.  
A comprehensive testing involving a full mockup of the cutting 
arrangement, materials, tooling, and waste capture and processing system 
is beneficial. Computer simulations can help to identify and mitigate high 
risk factors in advance. 
In the planning of RPV internal segmentation, plants should commit to 
capture the lessons learned from preceding projects. 
Abrasive water jet cutting provides a reasonable cutting speed and a high 
degree of precision. The cutting plan should minimize the number of cuts, 
produce waste pieces that can be easily packaged, and minimize the final 
waste volume. 
Segmentation should begin with the least irradiated components in order to 
gain experience with the tooling before applying it to highly radioactive 
components, where tooling failure could significantly increase personnel 
exposure. 
The benefits of using robotic equipment include minimizing worker 
exposure, precision and repeatability of movement and overall worker 
safety.  
Projects should use multi-purpose machines if possible. 
Explosives are a viable alternative to mechanical demolition, but impose 
the need for strict control, and it should only be used on clean or 
decontaminated buildings. 
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Waste 
Management 
The characteristics of the waste must be profoundly understood for efficient 
and a responsible and efficient management 
On site waste volume reduction should be limited to simple, efficient 
packaging activities. The absence of suitable repositories for intermediate 
level waste is not normally a reason to prevent going forward. Most waste 
types can be stored safely until repositories become available. 
Decommissioning efforts should focus on plant dismantlement and 
eliminating radioactive materials from the site rather than equipment 
decontamination.  
The waste conditioning infrastructures (mainly at older plants) are often 
obsolete, offer low levels of remote operation and are focused on the most 
abundant operating waste streams.  
The capacity of the storage facilities, for both conditioned and 
unconditioned waste, is a parameter to be kept under review from the 
design phase onwards. The capacities of storage facilities should be 
overestimated in design. 
The minimization of waste volumes during the process is of great economic 
and strategic importance; however, that this is an aspect that is often not 
dealt with as carefully as its importance demands. 
From the design phase to the completion of the decommissioning, the 
instruments required for giving assurance that waste volumes are being 
minimized should be in place. 
Consideration should be given to producing a logistical plan for the 
different waste packages to be moved. 
   17 
 
Stakeholders 
Decommissioning has a major impact on local communities, usually a 
negative one in the local economy. These negative consequences cannot 
be fully avoided but can be reduced through the involvement of the 
concerned parties. They should be involved since the beginning of the 
decommissioning process. 
It is essential to build trust with the various project regulators and 
stakeholders: keep them informed and updated is essential. Nevertheless, 
it is important to identify the different parties involved and develop an 
appropriate and specific strategy with each of them. Negotiation is often 
better than litigation. 
Public meetings with a community advisory panel have been successful in 
the past. Alternatives include updates in newsletters or advertisements in 
newspapers. It is a great benefit to have engineers who can discuss 




There are often problems in retaining a knowledgeable and skilled 
workforce to do decommissioning work. Measures to motivate and retain 
the most valuable professionals shall be put in place. 
It is important to develop an early de-staffing plan to retain needed workers 
and release the rest. This opens up opportunities to bring in workers with 
skills that are more suited to a decommissioning environment 
Site remediation 
Licensees should make reasonable efforts to prevent, detect, and control 
minor leaks of radioactive materials over prolonged periods of time.  
Minor leaks over long periods of time can contribute to significant 
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